I use a constraint pin to protect my data – here’s how it works

From two-factor authentication codes to conversations and photos, our phones contain a ton of sensitive data these days. We count on pins and biometrics for daily safety, but I shiver to think what would happen if these data landed in bad hands. And although Android is secure enough against distance attacks and malicious software these days, what happens if I have to unlock my phone and put it back? Graphineos, the Android fork focused on confidentiality, offers a rare solution to this hypothetical: the possibility of defining a spindle or a secondary password that wipes your device and leaves no trace of your presence.

I have a constraint pin on my phone for some time now. Although it is not something I need to need, knowing that it is there gives me peace of mind. And even if I don’t think Google will add a feature as extreme as it is to store Android, I can certainly see a use of less extreme implementation. Here is why.

Most devices will lock you after too many stranded unlocking attempts. But that does not mean that your data is safe – and if you are forced to give up your password or if the attacker guess your spindle? This is where grapheneos’ constraint spindle returns the dynamics: it allows you to define another pin or password that instantly triggers a silent and irreversible factory reset in the background.

The constraint pin does not give you a second chance and will trigger wherever you enter: on the locking screen, while activating developer options, or even when unlocking an application that requires authentication. And unlike regular factory reset, a constraint pin will erase all encryption keys and also the ESIM partition on your phone. This makes it impossible for an attacker to access my data simply by having the physical possession of your device and an knowledge of the pin.

I think that the true force of the clear graphene graphene pin is in its subtlety. There is no confirmation prompt, no announcement and no obvious sign that the wiping was intentional on your part. Of course, grapheneos is no longer a marginal operating system these days – he even attracted the anger of the police in certain jurisdictions. In other words, a professional attacker could be aware of the existence of a constraint pin. But if you can enter it fairly quickly, it makes its planned effect: no data can be removed from your phone.

The idea of a constraint pin is like something of a spy film, but is it really necessary? The functionality is certainly only useful in the fringe scenarios where I know an imminent risk for my phone data.

Take assault, for example. If an attacker forced you to unlock your phone before fleeing, you could rather enter your constraint spindle. Providing a constraint pin could make the difference between losing a device of $ 1,000 and emptying your bank accounts or your identity.

Even if you do not have to disclose the spindle yourself, I read an interesting suggestion on the grapheneos forum: what happens if you define an extremely simple or obvious sequence like your constraint pin? An amateur striker is forced to try pins like 1234 or 0000 when she gets your device – and it will be enough to erase the system for good, without any action from you. You can even save a note with the constraint pin on the back of your device and encourage them to enter them.

Then there is the elephant in the room – using a constraint pin if you expect to get in trouble with the police. This is a troubled subject since erasure of your data could be considered an obstruction or even destruction of evidence. So that you can have more problems than necessary, if you had nothing to hide. I think the latter is an argument of bad faith because he ignores the potential and tangible threat of overcoming. However, I don’t know if I would use my constraint pin if the police asked me to unlock my phone. But for government dissidents and activists, I am sure that the functionality can be invaluable if they know that someone hostile strikes their door.

One of the greatest advantages of Android is its solid support for several users. I find this functionality particularly useful on tablets, because they are generally shared devices. Each household user can connect to their own profile, with their own set of applications and data. But accessing this profile currently requires several taps on most Android devices. Even on the Pixel tablet, you must select a specific profile before entering the unlocking pin for this user. But what happens if this was not the case?

The graphens can recognize when you enter a constraint pin to trigger a wipe, so why stop there? Imagine if Android could connect you in a different user profile depending on the pin you have entered. In a situation where you have to unlock your phone, you can enter the lure spindle. This would open a apparently functional but highly backed version of your phone, hiding your banking applications, your private messages or your work accounts. I think that rides the line between the delivery of everything and the nuclear option of graphene to completely wipe the device.

Of course, you will need more than this level of plausible denial if you encounter serious problems. But for the airport control points where you may be invited to abandon access to your device, a lure pin may be sufficient to avoid a meticulous examination. Or if you need an interrupted profile for files and data that you do not necessarily want in your main profile, a secondary pin could take you.

The position of the grapheneos community on lure pins is that redirection to a secondary profile is not as secure as the triggering of a complete reset of the device, which is the current implementation of the stress pin. For a project that takes security seriously, the simple fact of connecting to a different profile is only half-measure.

Will Google never adopt a feature like the grapheneos stress table? It is unlikely, but on the positive side, the integrated Android locking mode is a step in the right direction. In the United States, the courts have judged that you may be forced to provide a fingerprint, but not a password. By deactivating biometrics, the Android locking mode offers a certain protection against legal coercion. If that is not enough for you, Graphèneos may well be the answer.